Fiscal Decentralization and The Proportion of Basic Infrastructure: Based On Yardstick Theory by 曾紫娟
 
学校编码：10384                                     分类号      密级        
学号：15520091151596                                                
UDC        
 
 
硕 士 学  位  论  文 
                                           
财政分权与基本建设支出比重——基于标
杆竞赛理论的分析 
Fiscal Decentralization and The Proportion of Basic 
Infrastructure: Based On Yardstick Theory 
 曾紫娟 
指导教师姓名：张 馨   教授 
专  业 名 称：财政学 
论文提交日期： 
论文答辩时间： 
学位授予日期：    
 
 
答辩委员会主席：           
评    阅    人：           


































                        声明人（签名）： 


































  1、保密（ ），在   年解密后适用本授权书。 




作者签名：      日期：  年 月 日 


















































































In the basis of Fiscal Decentralization theory and Yardstick Competition theory, 
the author does empirical research using panel data of 1999-2006 from 29 provinces, 
municipalities and autonomous regions in China. 
According to Yardstick Competition theory, China has provided a natural 
environment for complete yardstick competition among local officials as its political 
system simultaneously contains fiscal decentralization and the upward-concentration 
of power of local officials’ appointment. Under such circumstances, local officials 
compete for promotion; and the way that they succeed is to develop the local 
economy since GDP is the yardstick in this competition. This can explain the fact that 
‘Vote with feet’ theory doesn’t work in China, unlike the traditional fiscal 
decentralization theory. Both the political incentive and the financial incentive of local 
officials encourage local officials to be devoted to the economic construction instead 
of basic public services. As the theory and the empirical result show, the degree of 
fiscal decentralization of local government has a positive impact on the proportion of 
expenditure of infrastructure. The distortion of expenditure structure results from the 
competitive incentive of local officials. 
The major function of government should be providing basic public services, 
rather than excessively participating in economic construction. This distortion of 
current structure of fiscal expenditure may result in lots of problems in public service. 
As a result, the shift from ‘construction-oriented government’ to ‘service-oriented 
government’ is extremely urgent. From my point of view, the key factor of the 
transformation is to change the yardstick of the competition since fiscal 
decentralization is merely one of the elements which cause the distortion. Due to the 
fact that spending on infrastructure may effectively improve the speed of economy 
growth, local officials have tried every effort to spend more money on basic 
infrastructure as to speed up the growth of economy. It indicates the fact that all the 
problems may result from the yardstick competition which base on the indicator of 













comprehensive one that covers more factors of social benefit such as environment, 
medical insurance, and education. That’s how we can avoid the extremely purchase of 
GDP and keep away from the distortion in fiscal expenditure. 
The innovation lies in this paper distinguishes it from the others. What is the 
most important part concerned with the theoretical analysis and overall idea. In this 
paper, fiscal decentralism and yardstick competition theory have been combined. 
Moreover, the author stressed the importance of ‘individual choice’ which is the 
source of decision-making. And there is another discovery in the paper, the structure 
of fiscal revenue may also have an impact on the structure of fiscal expenditure. Local 
governments seem to spend more transferability revenue on basic infrastructure. 
There are also innovations in the empirical study in this paper. First of 
all, multiple indicators have been designed to measure the degree of fiscal 
decentralization depend on both the fiscal revenue and fiscal expenditure, which will 
make the analysis more complete. In addition, there is study of panel data across both 
nationwide and sub-region; that is how we can analyze the problem from the view of 
distinguished districts. Finally, another indicator has been designed to replace 
infrastructure spending as it has been canceled after the revolution of subjects of 
government budget in 2007. 
 

















1 引言 ................................................... 1 
1.1 研究背景与文献综述 ........................................... 1 
1.2 本文创新与不足 ............................................... 4 
2 理论基础及现状分析 ................................................... 6 
2.1 财政分权理论 ................................................. 6 
2.2 标杆竞赛理论 ................................................ 10 
2.3 财政分权与基本建设支出比重 .................................. 11 
3 计量模型设计和指标选择 ............................................. 13 
3.1 财政分权指标选择 ............................................ 13 
3.2 基本建设支出比重指标选择 .................................... 19 
3.3 模型设定.................................................... 22 
4 实证分析 ............................................. 26 
4.1 财政分权程度、政府竞争对基本建设支出比重的影响 .............. 27 
4.2 财政收入来源结构对基本建设支出比重的影响 .................... 28 
4.3 重大政策及其他控制变量对基本建设支出比重的影响 .............. 30 
5 结论及政策建议 ........................................ 32 
5.1 结论 ....................................................... 32 
5.2 构建综合性的竞赛指标 ........................................ 34 
5.3 完善竞赛指标的监督考核机制 .................................. 36 
































1  Introduction...................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Background and Literature Review ................................................... 1 
1.2 Innovation and Defects ...................................................................................... 4 
2 Theoretical Basis and Current Situation ........................................ 6 
2.1 Fiscal Decentralization Theory .......................................................... 6 
2.2 Yardstick Competition Theory ........................................................ 10 
2.3 Degree of Fiscal Decentralization and Proportion of Fiscal Expenditure
in Construction .............................................................................. 11 
3 Indicators Selection and Econometrical Model............................ 13 
3.1 Measurement of Degree of Fiscal Decentralization ............................ 13 
3.2Measurement of Proportion of Capital Construction Expenditure ........ 20 
3.3 Econometric Model Design ............................................................. 22 
4  Empirical Outcomes ...................................................................... 26 
4.1 The Impact of Fiscal Decentralizaion and Yardstick Competition on The 
Structure of Fiscal Expenditure ...................................................... 27 
4.2 The Impact of Stucture of Fiscal Revenue on Structure of Fiscal
Expenditure ................................................................................. 28 
4.3 The Impact of other Control Variables on The Structure of Fiscal 
Expenditure .................................................................................. 30 
5  Conclusion ...................................................................................... 32 
5.1 Conclusion.................................................................................... 32 
5.2 Create A Comprehensive Index of Yardstick Competition ............ 34 
5.3 Improve Supervision and Evaluation of Yardstick Competition . 36 




























































































在上世纪 90年代中期或者 2000年达到发展中国家的 4%的平均水平。然而，事
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